failure-to-deliver... was passiert mit meinen futures/ETFs/Optionen?

Moin!

weiß jemand, was passsiert, wenn es zu einem faliure to deliver (ftd) kommt? D.h. ich bin long Silber (oder Gold in futures/ETFs), und es wird trotz Anforderung nicht physisch geliefert...

Wie werden dann bspw. futures gesettled, wenn keine Barren verfügbar sind? Wird gerollt oder "egal zu welchem Preis eingedeckt und geliefert"?
Wenn es nicht physisch gesettled wird - zu welchem Preis? Wie lange dauert sowas?.. und, was passiert mit den anderen Investoren die futures halten (Folgemonate)?

John_Mayence: das war genau meine Frage - im Vertrag steht dass das clearing house eintritt, und die Erfüllung garantiert. Es wird aber nicht explizit erläutert, was im Falle von Nichtverfügbarkeit des underlyings passiert.

Mensch, ich bin echt überrascht... ich hatte eigentlich erwartet, dass entweder ne echte Antwort kommt (das Forum scheint echt gut zu sein), oder "Wtf?! Dein erster post ist ne Frage - biste zu faul, selber zu googlen?"
Stattdessen kommt bs... naja, egal.

Wie dem auch sei - ich habe die Antwort jetzt selber gefunden.

Kurzfassung:
Dieser Fall ist nicht geregelt - die US clearing house insurance liegt bei 25 mio USD, aber im Fall eines defaults können (und werden) clearing houses einfach pleite gehen. Aufgrund ungenügender juristischer Regelungen ist dann aber nicht klar, "wie" genau das passieren wird, nur "dass"...

https://www.brookings.edu/rese…if-a-clearinghouse-fails/

Es liegt nahe, dass der Staat eingreifen wird, um die clearing houses aufzufangen, weil sonst die Märkte kollabieren - aber zu welchen Bedingungen, ist ebenfalls tunklar.

"The logical strategy would be for the clearinghouse to file for Chapter 11, bankruptcy’s reorganization provisions. But a clearinghouse would probably be defined as a “commodities broker” for bankruptcy purposes.^[9] For reasons that were sensible in the 1970s but are much less so today, stock and commodities brokers are excluded from Chapter 11. They are only permitted to file for Chapter 7, the liquidation provisions.^[10]

Chapter 7 has a special framework for liquidating stock and commodities brokers, but these provisions were not designed with clearinghouses in mind. More importantly, neither Chapter 7 nor Chapter 11 provides a stay on derivatives—a standstill that would prevent counterparties from immediately terminating their derivatives contract—which would seriously complicate the effort to resolve the financial distress and to preserve the smooth functioning of the relevant derivatives market.Clearinghouses fall through the cracks of the current bankruptcy and resolution rules. If a substantial clearinghouse threatened to default, regulators’ only options would be to bail out the clearinghouse, or to risk a messy and potentially disastrous bankruptcy. This is precisely the scenario the Dodd-Frank Act was intended to remedy.

The major players are aware of the lacuna in regulation. They have been working to put contractual resolution rules in place the clearinghouses.^[11]
The approaches that have emerged thus far provide for a “waterfall” of responses to the prospect of financial distress.^[12]

Under one strategy, if the crisis is triggered by the failure of one or more members of the clearinghouse, the first response is to use the member’s contribution to the clearinghouse’s guaranty fund and its initial margin payments. If this is not sufficient to staunch the losses, the second response is to use part of the clearinghouse’s operator capital. Third comes the guaranty fund contributions of the other members of the clearinghouses, and fourth is the remainder of the clearinghouse’s operator capital. If this sequence of responses is not sufficient to stabilize the clearinghouse, the clearinghouse can take the more dramatic steps of taxing the variation margin gains of clearinghouse members whose contracts are in the money, and finally, “tearing up” or partially “tearing up” some or all of the contracts—that is, unilaterally restructuring or cancelling them.

The contractual strategies are elegant but precarious and incomplete. The first problem is the uncertainty created for the nondefaulting members of a clearinghouse.^[13]

Even if a member has managed its risks prudently, it faces the prospect of variation margin gain cuts or contract tearups if another member defaults. The uncertainty as to the magnitude of the cuts, and whether the clearinghouse will in fact resort to these drastic measures, is costly to the nondefaulting members. To avoid this uncertainty, a nondefaulting member that it not dependent on the clearinghouse’s services may seek to exit the clearinghouse if it anticipates problems, which could exacerbate the clearinghouse’s instability. If the nondefaulting member has major exposure to the clearinghouse and does not exit, by contract, the cuts could undermine the member’s own stability.

Second, it is difficult to know for sure whether the “waterfall” will in fact work; even if only one member defaults, or at most two,^[14] the adjustments may not be sufficient, or they may not be implemented quickly enough to stabilize the troubled clearinghouse. The risks that the procedure will not be adequately are especially high if the distress is more widespread.

Given these uncertainties, regulators can hardly be expected to trust the contractual resolution process. [...]
For a clearinghouse that is not systemically important, bankruptcy is likely to be the resolution venue. Current bankruptcy law falls short of providing an adequate resolution mechanism in two key respects. First, regulators have little role. Perhaps most importantly, current law does not authorize regulators to initiate the bankruptcy case. Given the importance of having stability and continuity in the derivatives markets, this is a crucial disability."

quelle: https://www.brookings.edu/rese…if-a-clearinghouse-fails/

@Patrone & Skeptisch:

hey, vielen Dank! Yup, habt recht, ich sollte konkreter werden.

underlying: Gold, Silber, Platin.

instrumente: primär futures, konkret SI @ Globex 5k oz,
=> https://www.cmegroup.com/marke…silver.contractSpecs.html
Die minis sind normalerweise cash settled, da besteht dieses Problem also nicht in dieser Form.

Anlass zu der Frage: BoA / JPM Positionen gem OCC s.a. untenstehende links (lohnt sich zu lesen, dauert insgesamt 5 min):

• https://www.investmentrarities.com/theodore-butler-silver-archives-january-26-2022
  
• https://www.investmentrarities…archives-february-8-2022/
• https://www.investmentrarities…rchives-february-22-2022/

Was die Fonds angeht, gings mir um GLD, SILV / PSILV... der "beste" Fund, den ich gefunden habe (bzgl phys. Lieferung) ist Sprott, aber da braucht man relativ viel EK, um physisch zu beziehen. ZKB hatte ich mir vor einigen Jahren die terms durchgelesen , und fand das als noch schwieriger als bei Sprott.

@Skepti$ever:

Nehmen wir mal Silber - wenn Butler recht hat, und allein die BoA 800 mio Unzen short… Anmelden oder registrieren

@ Alibaba:

einer von uns beiden hat scheinbar einen Hirnschlag.

Ich habe keine Ahnung, wovon du… Anmelden oder registrieren